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This essay addresses three questions. First, what exactly is so
strange and disturbing about human cloning? Second, how do the
strange and disturbing aspects of cloning translate into constitutional
doctrine? Specifically, how are they relevant to whether or not the
constitutional right of privacy protects cloning to create a child?
Third, granting that there are many bad reasons to ban cloning, are
there also some good reasons why the state might wish to prohibit the
cloning of human beings?
I. Three Characteristics of Human Cloning
In an article titled The Wisdom of Repugnance, Dr. Leon Kass,
who now heads President George W. Bush's Council on Bioethics,
declares that "offensive, grotesque, revolting, repugnant, and
repulsive.., are the words most commonly heard regarding the
prospect of human cloning."1 His repugnance seems to be shared by
the vast majority of Americans. Polls taken over the last five years
consistently show that most Americans oppose the cloning of human
beings.2 According to Kass, such "repugnance is the emotional
expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate
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1. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of
Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679,686 (1998).
2. Ninety percent of respondents to a Time/CNN poll taken in February 2001 believe
it is a bad idea to clone human beings, which is almost as many as the 93% who were
opposed to human cloning in a Time/CNN poll taken four years earlier, shortly after the
announcement of the successful cloning of a sheep named Dolly. Although the specific
results of any given poll depend upon its exact wording and approach, "it seems
indisputable that human reproductive cloning is not popular in the United States." REP.
OF THE CAL. ADVISORY COMMrrrEE ON HUM. CLONING, CLONING CALIFORNIANS? 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1145 (2002) [hereinafter CLONING CALIFORNIANS?].
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it."3 His argument is as follows:
We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not
because of the strangeness or novelty of the undertaking, but
because we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the
violation of things that we rightfully hold dear. Repugnance, here
as elsewhere, revolts against the excesses of human willfulness,
warning us not to transgress what is unspeakably profound.
Indeed, in this age in which everything is held to be permissible so
long as it is freely done, in which our given human nature no longer
commands respect, in which our bodies are regarded as mere
instruments of our autonomous rational wills, repugnance may be
the only voice left that speaks up to defend the central core of our
humanity. Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to
shudder.4
Kass compares cloning to incest, bestiality, and cannibalism, which
also provoke a visceral negative response that cannot be completely
captured in rational arguments.5
Other scholars believe that we should distrust disgust.6 Not only
is revulsion alone not an argument, but it may often signal fear of the
unknown or unthinking prejudice. Professor Laurence Tribe warns
that we should not ban cloning for the wrong reasons He argues
that it is not a coincidence that Kass' opposition to cloning is
embedded in an essay that decries the sexual revolution, feminism,
and the gay rights movement, suggesting that cloning may be feared
because of its potential to contribute to the decline of the traditional
family.' On this view, cloning is "the technological apotheosis of
Murphy Brown and Ellen DeGeneres, the biomedical nemesis of Dan
Quayle, Phyllis Schlafly, and Pat Robertson" precisely because it
would allow single women, gay men, and lesbians to have children
In order to determine whether cloning should be prohibited or
permitted, it is necessary first to understand the motivations
underlying the impulse to ban human cloning. Why do so many
people recoil from the prospect of human cloning, and consider it so
odd and unsettling, or even offensive and repugnant? Precisely what
is it about cloning that they find so deeply disturbing? Are there
good reasons for this widespread repugnance, or does it simply reflect
fear of the unknown and irrational prejudice?
3. Kass, supra note 1, at 687.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONs 423,453-54 (2001).
7. Laurence Tribe, On Not Banning Cloning for the Wrong Reasons, in CLONES AND
CLONES 221 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998).
8. Id. at 226-27.
9. I& at 227.
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I believe that there are at least three aspects of human cloning
that produce this deep anxiety in the public at large. First, cloning
involves asexual replication rather than sexual reproduction. Cloning
is asexual not only because it separates babymaking from sex, but also
because it does not even require the joinder of sperm and egg to
produce a child. Cloning consequently results in the replication of an
existing genome; it does not involve the random recombination of
genes, which in sexual reproduction results in a child with a new and
unique genetic identity."
Second, as a consequence of the first feature, cloning also
provides the awesome power to engage in a form of genetic selection,
to choose the child's entire genome, and to predetermine its genetic
identity. Instead of risking the randomness of the genetic lottery to
create a child with a completely unpredictable mix of genes,
prospective parents can use cloning to simply duplicate an existing
person, a person with a known genetic identity."
Third, cloning affords not just the power to select the child's
entire genetic make-up, but also the power to produce multiple copies
of the same person. In so doing, cloning essentially opens the door to
the mass production of human beings.
What are the consequences of these three characteristics of
human cloning? First, unlike sexual reproduction, which is inherently
collaborative, requiring at least a minimal degree of cooperation with
other persons in order to obtain both sperm and egg, asexual
replication can be performed by one person acting all alone, without
reproductive assistance from others. Thus cloning frees individuals
from the need to connect with others and engage in marriage or any
kind of intimate relationship in order to have children. In so doing,
cloning could be viewed as radically individualistic and ultimately
antisocial or even alienating, the paradigm right of isolated
individuals. In an article entitled The Demand for Human Cloning,
Judge Richard Posner and Professor Eric Posner suggest that cloning
would actually lower or eliminate the natural barriers to reproduction
currently provided by the need to cooperate with others in order to
find someone willing to donate sperm, egg, or gestational services. 2
In so doing, it would enable extreme narcissists, psychologically
disturbed individuals, sociopaths, and other misfits to replicate
10. Technically, a clone produced by somatic cell nuclear transfer would not be
completely genetically identical to the genetic donor. Although the clone would possess
the same genotype, he or she would result from a different egg, with its own distinct
mitochondrial DNA. See CLONING CALIFORNIANS?, supra note 2, at 1176 (on
psychological harm to cloned child).
11. But see the caveat noted in the preceding footnote.
12. Eric A. Posner & Richard A. Posner, The Demand for Human Cloning, in CLONES
AND CLONES, supra note 7, at 233.
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themselves to the detriment of the rest of society. 3 This may be one
source of the anxiety about human cloning.
Another source of anxiety is attributable to the fact that cloning
would make it possible to produce a child who is virtually genetically
identical to an existing or previously existing person. As a result,
many fear that the cloned child would suffer from a loss of uniqueness
and a diminished sense of individuality, grounded in the fact that he
or she is believed to be the genetic copy of another. Studies of
identical twins arguably provide some indication of whether that fear
is justified: Professor Nancy Segal points out that the similarities
between identical twins do not necessarily produce psychological
harms, and sometimes result in psychological benefits from a feeling
of enhanced identity.4 On the other hand, it could be argued that the
difference between a clone and an identical twin is that identical twins
begin life with a blank slate, equally ignorant of each other's destiny,
whereas a cloned child starts life with the knowledge of what his
genetic predecessor has already become. As a result, the cloned child
may feel that much about himself or his fate is already
predetermined, losing the sense of freely constructing his own identity
and choosing his own future. Even if we do not believe in genetic
determinism, we may fear that the life of a cloned child would always
be haunted by the shadow of the original and unduly shaped and
constrained by the expectations of others. And even if such
expectations are false, if they are widely shared by the child's parents
and by society, they risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Hence,
the cloned child would arguably be deprived of the right to a unique
identity and denied the right to an open future."
Moreover, by offering the power to select the child's entire
genome, cloning might not only cause parents to harbor unrealistic
expectations, but also to view the cloned child more as an object
manufactured according to precise specifications than as an
independent person. To the extent that cloning fosters such social
attitudes, it may ultimately lead to the objectification of children in
general, who will be treated as mere means to parental fulfillment
rather than as ends to be loved and cherished for themselves. By
blurring the boundaries between biology and technology, cloning
seems to move us one step closer to a view of children as man made
products, rather than natural creations.
Finally, part of the anxiety about cloning is attributable to a fear
13. See id.
14. See Nancy L. Segal, Human Cloning: Insights from Twins and Twin Research, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1075 (2002).
15. For a general discussion of the right to an open future, see Joel Feinberg, The
Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL
AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980).
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of mass production of individuals with desired genotypes. This
possibility evokes science-fiction images of armies of identical clone
automata who will be regarded as fungible goods or products that are
manufactured according to preset specifications, and maybe even
traded on the market just like any other widget, rather than unique
beings who are priceless. Of course, cloning doesn't necessarily put a
price tag on any particular individual, nor does it necessarily lead to
the trade of cloned children on the market. But if cloning does cause
people to be viewed as fungible products, it is feared that we may
move one step closer towards markets in people and body parts.
Such a result would threaten not only to commodify persons but also
to commercialize the family, a realm which many believe should be
shielded from the economic pressures that govern the market.
How do these three aspects of cloning compare to other assisted
reproductive technologies whose use is already widespread, such as
artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and surrogate
motherhood? The other assisted reproductive technologies also
separate babymaking from sex, but they still require sexual
reproduction: the joinder of sperm and egg. The other assisted
reproductive technologies also afford some opportunities for genetic
selection. Artificial insemination may be accomplished with the use
of genius sperm banks offering sperm derived from Nobel prize
winners, and in vitro fertilization may be accompanied by web sites
selling supermodels' eggs or advertisements in college newspapers
offering a premium price for eggs obtained from donors with specially
valued physical or intellectual attributes. One assisted reproductive
technology applies a much more advanced mode of genetic selection.
In vitro fertilization coupled with preimplantation genetic diagnosis
enables couples at risk of conceiving children with certain genetic
diseases to examine a single cell taken from an embryo that has been
created in vitro, in order to genetically select only those embryos that
are free from the risk of that particular disease. Thus, these other
assisted reproductive technologies also allow a certain degree of
genetic selection, but they still require the random recombination of
genes to create a child with a new and unpredictable genome, rather
than the duplication of a person with a known genetic identity.
Moreover, while these other assisted reproductive technologies
actually involve the commercial purchase and sale of eggs, sperm, and
gestational services on the market, they do not provide the capacity
for the mass production of many identical human beings.
H. A Constitutional Right to Clone?
So, what does all this mean for the question whether or not there
is a constitutional right to clone a human being? Paradoxically, the
July 20021 WHAT'S SO STRANGE?
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very same features that make cloning appear so alien and unsettling,
also render it more private than existing methods of assisted
reproduction. Artificial insemination generally involves the
participation of sperm donors, while in vitro fertilization and
surrogacy may require the involvement of egg donors and those who
supply gestational services. By bringing these strangers who are
necessary to provide gametes or gestational services into the
reproductive process, the couple attempting to reproduce is
diminishing the privacy of their intimate association and
simultaneously enhancing the state's interest in protecting these other
individuals, who become potential parties to the relationship and
whose own interests and rights may diverge from those of the
couple.6 But cloning does not require the intrusion of any strangers
in the reproductive process precisely because it can be performed all
alone, without the reproductive assistance of others (aside from those
who provide merely technical assistance). Moreover, other forms of
assisted reproduction may involve the commercial exchange of sperm,
eggs, and gestational services, placing them outside the boundaries of
the constitutional right of privacy,7 but this is not true of cloning,
which does not necessarily involve any commercial transactions at all,
apart from contracting for merely technical assistance.
Ironically, even though cloning is more private than other
methods of assisted reproduction, because it is free from the
participation of strangers and the influence of commercial interests, it
also seems alien and even antithetical to the values underlying the
constitutional right of privacy. Because of that, human cloning
actually calls into question the meaning of the constitutional right of
privacy. It places us at a crossroads between two competing visions of
privacy-privacy as an individualistic right and privacy as a relational
or communitarian value.'8 Both strands of privacy resonate with the
case law. If privacy protects the individual's right to reproductive
autonomy, then cloning would naturally be next in line for
constitutional protection to the extent that it involves individuals who
are acting all alone in reproducing, free from the conflicting needs or
interests of others. But if privacy is viewed as a right, not of isolated
individuals, but of those engaged in intimate relationships, then
cloning should receive no constitutional protection.
How do we choose between these competing conceptions of
privacy? I would choose the latter conception of privacy as a
relational right. I have previously argued that the principle that
16. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive
Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077,1117 (1998).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 1078-79.
connects the series of cases involving marriage, the family,
procreation, parenting, and sexuality is not Justice Brandeis' famous
"right to be let alone." 9 On the contrary, it is the right to come
together in close consensual relationships.20 Privacy does not simply
guarantee individuals the right to sexual, reproductive, and parental
autonomy.21 It protects the relationships between people that develop
in the course of these activities, rather than the individual's solo right
to engage in such activities.' Accordingly, the right of privacy should
not attach to isolated individuals; it belongs instead to close
relationships, fostering intimate associations that mediate between
the individual and the state.' Privacy should be viewed as a relational
right that "afford[s] the formation and preservation of certain kinds
of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary
from unjustified interference by the State., 24
Can this understanding of privacy be reconciled with the
contraception and abortion cases,' or with the one case in which the
Supreme Court struck down a law authorizing compulsory
sterilization of certain categories of criminals? 2 Do these cases
presuppose that the right to privacy is an individual right, or are they
consistent with the concept of privacy as a relational value? I believe
that reflecting on the differences between the issues in these cases
and the issue of cloning shows that they may be reconciled with the
understanding of privacy that I am defending here.
It is true that the Supreme Court has found a fundamental
constitutional right to avoid reproduction, whether by means of
contraception or abortion. Some scholars infer that there is a parallel
fundamental right to reproduce with the assistance of new
technologies, including cloning.' But one reproductive right does not
necessarily follow from the other. The Supreme Court relied heavily
19. See iL at 1102 and n.154 (citing Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Berger v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967)).




24. Id. at 1103 and n.157 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)).
25. See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married persons because it violated their
constitutional right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons
on equal protection grounds).
26. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a Texas statute
criminalizing abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (retaining and
reaffirming the "essential holding" of Roe).
27. Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
28. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEx. L.
REV. 1371, 1441 (1998).
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upon two factors in the contraception and abortion cases that are
conspicuously missing from the cloning context. Because pregnancy
entails a massive invasion and occupation of a woman's body,
constitutional protection for the right to avoid reproduction is
essential both to safeguard bodily autonomy and to ensure gender
equality.29 But these precedents erect no constitutional barrier to a
ban upon human cloning, which neither results in invasion of the
integrity of the body nor endangers women's equality. Compulsory
sterilization laws similarly implicate the concerns regarding bodily
integrity and social equality that animated the Court in the
contraception and abortion decisions, so they, too, are distinguishable
from laws regulating medically assisted reproduction." The lesson of
these decisions is that autonomy works in tandem with equality.
Sometimes it is necessary to recognize a right to reproductive
autonomy in order to prevent gender or class inequality. But the
same analysis does not apply when the claim for autonomy threatens
to reproduce existing inequalities and create new inequalities.
I1. On Banning Cloning Only for the Right Reasons
All of this suggests that a law banning human cloning would be
fundamentally different from a law banning contraception or
abortion, or a law compelling sterilization, to the extent that it is
motivated by concern for the ways in which human cloning threatens
to undermine individual autonomy and exacerbate inequality. In
Washington v. Glucksberg,31 the Supreme Court upheld a law
preventing physician-assisted suicide, even though it deprived some
individuals of the right to make a deeply personal and intimate
choice-the choice to terminate life. In that case, the state asserted
strong and substantial interests, both in protecting individual
autonomy by preventing the addition of what could be seen as an
inherently coercive choice, and in furthering equality by preventing
judgments about the relative quality and value of different lives,
which could threaten the interests of those who are poor or others
who are disadvantaged in our society.32 The same analysis could be
applied to a law banning human reproductive cloning, because the
freedom to engage in human cloning also threatens to undermine true
autonomy, and to reproduce existing inequalities while perhaps even
creating some new ones.
In theory, cloning technology promises to enhance autonomy by
affording individuals a new option, which they are free to use or
29. See Rao, supra note 16, at 1112-13.
30. See id.
31. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
32. See id. at 731-32.
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refuse. However, the very existence of such technology may
undermine autonomy in several different ways, for both parents and
their cloned children. Once such technology exists, it may trigger a
genetic "arms race" in which parents feel compelled to use cloning
technology because they fear that failure to do so could result in a
competitive disadvantage to their child.3 3 The Posners thus argue that
the demand for human cloning would extend far beyond those who
are infertile.3 They argue that there is a real danger that cloning
could ultimately crowd out sexual reproduction because the
genetically best-endowed would clone themselves rather than mix
their genes with people on the rung below, and so on down the line,
until the least well-endowed would ultimately be forced to clone due
to the inability to find anyone willing to mate with them.3' Thus, the
very existence of the choice to clone may ultimately take away the
choice not to clone, undermining true autonomy. Moreover, even if
prospective parents would opt out of such a genetic "arms race,"
market forces may achieve virtually the same results, coercing all but
the very wealthy to use cloning technology whenever it is deemed
necessary to conceive and carry to term "healthy" children.
Individuals may face financial pressures to use cloning in order to
ensure the birth of a child free from risk of a genetic disease, exerted
by insurance companies, employers, or a society unwilling to
subsidize the choice not to use such technology under certain
circumstances. And finally, the autonomy of the cloned child might
also be undermined to the extent that he or she is viewed and treated
as the genetic copy of another.
Beyond threatening the autonomy of prospective parents and
cloned children, use of cloning technology may also pose more
pervasive risks to all of society. First, unequal access to such powerful
technologies may exacerbate inequalities in our society, enabling the
wealthy to pass on their privileges to their progeny in perpetuity. If
cloning actually serves as a form of genetic selection and if some of
the success of the wealthy is attributable to their superior genetic
endowment, then by confining cloning to those wealthy enough to
afford the technology, it is possible that we risk creating entrenched,
virtually permanent, caste hierarchies. In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme
Court expressed concern about the denial of public education to
illegal alien children because this might "promot[e] the creation and
perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries., 36 But
33. Professor Peter Huang uses economic analysis to make the same argument for
genetic selection technologies. See Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 639 (1999).
34. See Posner & Posner, supra note 12.
35. See id.
36. 457 U.S. 202,230 (1982).
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if educational inequalities are troubling because they could
perpetuate a caste system, then what about genetic inequalities?
Moreover, the very existence of cloning technology could alter
our concept of what is "normal" and disadvantage all those who
deviate from society's ideal, ultimately entrenching notions of
geneticism or genetic essentialism. By thus fostering attitudes that
reduce people to their genes and encourage genetic discrimination,
cloning could endanger the equality of all citizens.
In theory, cloning could also be used to enhance equality by
enabling individuals from social groups that have historically suffered
discrimination to achieve parenthood. Cloning could, for example,
empower single women, gay men, and lesbians to have children that
are genetically related to them, without risking the involvement of
third parties in the process. But I believe that cloning technology
would actually be used in a way that would at best replicate existing
patterns of inequality. Dr. Lee Silver presented a survey from
Harper's Magazine suggesting that, if given the power to engage in
genetic selection, 84% of the individuals surveyed would use it to
select for disease immunity and 64% would use it to select for
intelligence, but an astounding 51% would use such technology to
screen for sexual orientation and another 19% confessed that they
would use such technology to select for gender.37 Thus, it is more
likely that cloning technology would actually be used, not to enhance
the rights of single women, gay men, and lesbians, but rather to
screen them out of the population.
To conclude, I agree with many of the participants in this
symposium that we should not ban human cloning for the wrong
reasons-out of ignorance of what cloning really is, or fear of the
unknown, out of repugnance for what seems unnatural or against the
intentions of God, or out of prejudice against a technology that allows
single women, gay men, and lesbians to have children. Those are all
illegitimate reasons for banning human cloning. But this does not
mean that human cloning should not be banned for the right reasons:
out of genuine concern for autonomy, both of the cloned person, who
may become the prisoner of preset expectations, and of prospective
parents, who may feel financial or social pressure to use this
technology in order to provide their children with a competitive edge
in society; out of genuine concern for the harms that might result
from the objectification and commodification of cloned children; and
out of genuine concern that cloning technology could be used, not
only to reproduce existing inequalities, but also to create new
categories of discrimination and new classes of prejudice.
37. See Lee Silver, Public Policy Crafted in Response to Public Ignorance is Bad Public
Policy, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (2002).
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